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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

also rejected the plaintiff's contention that the principle of collateral
estoppel cannot be applied where the prior proceeding was a criminal
prosecution, noting that mutuality of estoppel is no longer required8 7
and finding it "very significant"8 8 that in Schindler v. Royal Insurance
Co., 9 the Court of Appeals stated that in the absence of that doctrine,
a prior criminal determination could be the basis of collateral estoppel
in a subsequent civil action.
The dissent, which contested the majority's finding that the issues
in this proceeding had been previously adjudicated, argued that the
essence of the plaintiff's malpractice "seems to be [that it was] bad
legal advice to take a plea of guilty.... [P]laintiff might, given the
opportunity, be able to prove that he had available a good defense
to the indictment." 90
It is laudable that Vavolizza eliminated the anachronistic distinction 91 between a criminal determination and a civil proceeding made
in prior New York cases in applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
In lieu of granting the defendant's motion to dismiss, however, it
would have been preferable for the court to admit the denial of the
plaintiff's motion to withdraw his plea in order to establish that the
plea had not been coerced and then to permit the plaintiff to litigate
the broader question of the defendant's alleged malpractice on grounds
other than coercion.
CPLR 3215(a): Court sua sponte dismisses complaint for improper
service in response to plaintiff's motion for default judgment.
CPLR 3215(c) provides for dismissal of a complaint as abandoned,
in the discretion of the court, where the plaintiff has failed to proceed
to enter a default judgment for more than one year after default. 92 In
such a case, Career Placements Inc. v. Sibilia,9 3 the Nassau County
District Court held that the summons was not properly served where
the process server's affidavit failed to state facts constituting diligent
effort to effect personal service94 before resort was had to substituted
Id. at 449, 336 N.Y.S.2d at 752.
88 Id. at 448, 336 N.Y.S.2d at 751.
89 258 N.Y. 310, 179 N.E. 711 (1932).
90 39 App. Div. 2d at 449, 336 N.Y.S.2d at 752.
91 In federal cases, no such distinction is made. See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 354 US.
298 (1957) (dictum); Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558 (1951);
United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85 (1916); United States v. Fabric Garment Co.,
366 F.2d 530 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v. Guzzone, 273 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1959).
927B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 3215, commentary at 870-71 (1970); 4 WK&-M
3215.13,
3215.14, 3215.15.
93 71 Misc. 2d 345, 336 N.Y.S.2d 83 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1972).
94 Id., 336 N.Y.S.2d at 84, citing Blatz v. Benschine, 53 Misc. 2d 352, 278 N.YS.2d 533
(Sup. Ct. Queens County 1967), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 42 ST. JOHN'S L. Rrv.
87
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service under CPLR 308(4)Y 5 In vacating the summons and dismissing
the complaint sua sponte in response to the plaintiff's motion for a
default judgment, the court noted the growing concern with "sewer
service"9 6 and cautioned that "[a]ffidavits of [this] kind, totally devoid
of facts to show even a semblance of compliance with the statute are
not 'requisite proof' "97 for entry of a default judgment by the clerk
under CPLR 3215(a).
This laudable decision serves notice to the bar that there must be
exact compliance with the personal service prerequisites of CPLR
308(4).98
CPLR 3216: Claim that failure to timely file note of issue was result
of attorney's poor health, without medical evidence, will not prevent
dismissal for want of prosecution.
CPLR 3216 authorizes a court to dismiss an action for want of

prosecution on its own initiative or on motion. 9 Issue must have been
joined, one year must pass after such joinder, and a written demand
must be served on the plaintiff to file a note of issue within 45 days.

If a plaintiff fails to file a note of issue after demand, the court may
dismiss the action unless he shows a justifiable excuse for the delay
and a meritorious cause of action.
In Prezio v. Milanese,100 the defendant moved to dismiss a per-

sonal injury action for lack of prosecution when no note of issue was
283, 302 (1967); Goldner v. Reiss, 64 Misc. 2d 785, 315 N.Y.S.2d 644 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y.
County 1970). The affidavit listed four dates on which service of the summons was attempted, but set forth "no hour, no inquiry or search for the defendant."
95 See 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 308, commentary at 208 (1972); 1 WK&M
308.13,
308.13a, 308.14. Prior to resorting to such service, a diligent effort must be made to serve
the party by either personal service or delivery of the summons to a person of suitable
age and discretion at the actual place of business, dwelling place, or abode of the party
and mailing of a copy to his last known residence.
96 71 Misc. 2d at 346, 336 N.Y.S.2d at 85, citing All-State Credit Corp. v. Riess, 61 Misc.
2d 677, 306 N.Y.S.2d 596 (App. T. 2d Dep't 1970), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 45
ST. JoHN's L REv. 145, 165 (1970) (affirming the action of the district court which sua
sponte vacated the judgments and dismissed the complaints against 669 defendants for
failure to allege a basis for personal jurisdiction in the pleadings).
97 71 Misc. 2d at 346, 336 N.Y.S.2d at 85.
98 See Jones v. King, 24 App. Div. 2d 430, 260 N.Y.S.2d 666 (1st Dep't 1965) (mem.);
Polansky v. Paugh, 23 App. Div. 2d 643, 256 N.Y.S.2d 961 (1st Dep't 1965) (mem.); 7B
MCKINNEY'S CPLR 308, commentary at 208 (1972).
99 See 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 3216, supp. commentary at 56-57 (1970). See generally
H. WAcHTLL, Nmv YoRK PRAarrcE UNDER THE CPLR 312-14 (3d ed. 1970). In order to protect the client's interests, the courts have been imposing substantial personal costs upon
delinquent attorneys. Moran v. Rynar, 39 App. Div. 2d 718, 332 N.Y.S.2d 138 (2d Dep't
1972) (mene).
100 40 App. Div. 2d 910, 337 N.Y.S.2d 842 (3d Dep't 1972) (mem.).

